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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE
LIABILITY OF CHURCHES FOR
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
JOHN H. MANSFIELD*
Abstract: In the many suits against churches during the past several
years for alleged misbehavior of clergy, a wide variety of tort theories
have been put forward as possible bases for recovery. Among these are
breach of fiduciary duty owed to church members, negligence in hiring,
supervision and retention of clergy, intentional or negligent infliction
of mental distress and vicarious liability for torts committed by
individual clergy. This Article explores possible federal constitutional
barriers to these tort actions, focusing mostly on the torts of negligent
supervision and breach of fiduciary duty.
INTRODUCTION
In the many suits against churches during the past several years
for alleged misbehavior of clergy, a wide variety of tort theories have
been put forward as possible bases for recovery. Among these are
breach of fiduciary duty owed to church members, negligence in hir-
ing, supervision and retention of clergy, intentional or negligent
infliction of mental distress and vicarious liability for torts committed
by individual clergy.' In the present Article, I explore possible federal
constitutional barriers to these tort actions, focusing mostly on the
torts of negligent supervision and breach of fiduciary duty.
I. GOVERNMENT MAY NOT ANSWER RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
The first principle that must be accepted as established is that the
outcome of a tort suit against a church may not be based upon a gov-
* John H. Watson, jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
I See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Pro-
tection, 75 INn, Lj. 219 (2000) (reviewing many of the important cases); see also Malicki
Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 n.2, 358 n.10 (Fla. 2002); James T. O'Reilly & joAnn M. Strasser,
Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues,
7 Sr. Titomns L. Ruv. 31, 38-59 (1994),
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ernmental answer—whether given by a legislature, administrative
official, court or jury—to a religious question. This principle was es-
tablished in United States v. Ballard over fifty years ago, and finds its
basis in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. 2
 For an agency of the state to make a finding
of fact on a religious question would tend to suppress other answers
to that question and impair freedom in matters of religion. Of course,
determining what constitutes a religious question within this prohibi-
tion is not a matter free from doubt. Is a religious question a question
whose answer depends upon faith rather than reason? Is a religious
question one that pertains to the existence of a spiritual, transcendent
or absolute reality? 3 In the Ballard case, a prosecution for mail fraud,
some of the defendants' representations clearly were about spiritual
matters, but others hovered about the border between the celestial
and the terrestrial . 4
 For present purposes, we need not enter into this
problem, nor need we attempt to answer the question: if government
may not base its activities upon assertions about spiritual realities,
upon what basis may they rest?
The constitutional prohibition against answering religious ques-
dons does not end with forbidding findings of fact that require faith
or that pertain to the spiritual or transcendent. It also forbids findings
regarding temporal realities that make reference to spiritual realities.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution prohibits the
government from determining what someone thought or intended in
regard to a religious matter. Thus the government is forbidden from
determining that the senior of a trust or a party to a contract had a
certain idea or intention in regard to a religious matter, even though
the fact that he had such an idea or intention is a fact of this world. 5
This prohibition was set forth clearly by the Supreme Court in Presby-
terian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church and in Jones v.
Wolf.6
 Both cases involved disputes within churches about doctrine
and polity, which ultimately affected rights to church property.? The
Court held that in deciding who owned and had the right to control
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1; 322 U.S. 78,86-87 (1944).
3 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,173-85 (1965) (discussing the meaning of
religion in provision for exemption of conscientious objectors itt selective service law).
4 322 U.S. at 79-81.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,602-06 (1979); Presbyterian Church 'c Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Meal Church, 393 U.S. 440,445-52 (1969).
6 Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-06; Blue Hug 393 U.S. at 445-52.
7
 Wolf, 443 U.S. at 597; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 441-43.
2003]	 • Negligent Supervision & Breach of Fiduciary Duty 	 1169
the property, courts could not determine the nature of a religious
idea—such as what was meant by Presbyterianism. 8 The reason for this
prohibition is not the inability of a court to answer such a question,
but the fear that if it does give an answer, no matter how careful it
may be in assessing all the evidence, its answer is likely to be
influenced or thought to be influenced by its own views about a par-
ticular religion or religion in general, or by secular considerations. 9
One can appreciate that if a court interprets a very general provision,
such as "they shall enjoy the property so long as they are faithful to
the teachings of Vatican II," these fears would not be groundless. At
the same dine, if a court is asked to determine the meaning and pur-
pose of a nonreligious organization—the Odd Fellows for instance—
there is no constitutional bar to the court doing its best to answer the
question on the basis of available evidence. At least there is no re-
straint coming from the religion clauses of the First Amendment. It is
only when the question posed pertains to religion, so that the answer
may be influenced by religious ideas or religious ideas may be over-
ridden by secular ideas, that the First Amendment forbids courts from
answering. Even though a court's answer may not be an expression of
faith, if it would touch upon a matter that is the object of faith for the
parties and others, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment requires courts to steer clear of the question. 19
A consequence of the Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition is that when a
case presents a religious question, there must be a special rule for
disposing of the case. The religious question must be set aside and the
dispute somehow decided upon another ground. The irony of the
situation is that although the Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition protects relig-
ions freedom in the sense of excluding government ideas about what
is desirable, it creates a special difficulty for the implementation of
private plans relating to religion by depriving them of a certain kind
of government assistance in their fulfillment. In the case of the Odd
Fellows, by contrast, courts plunge ahead and do their best to decide,
for instance, which of two warring factions are the true Odd Fellows
as determined by the intentions of the founders. This consequence
must always leave a lingering doubt as to the correctness of the Blue
Hull-Wolf prohibition.
See Wolf 443 U.S. at 602-05; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 445-47,449-50,
9 See Wolf 443 U.S. at 602-05; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449-50.
10 See Wolf 443 U.S. at 602-05; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 445-47,449-50.
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As applied in the context of tort actions against churches, the
Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition means that liability may not be based upon
a court's interpretation of the church's own law, customs or traditions.
If it were the case—which it very rarely would be—that there is no
doubt that there was a violation of church law—perhaps a church
official with undoubted and final authority has so declared it—then
the Blue Hull-Wolf principle might not apply. But another question
would be presented: assuming that a nonreligious organization may
be held liable in tort for a violation of its own rules, itself a matter of
doubt, would the religion clauses of the Constitution permit the same
approach to be taken towards a religious organization?
There are more subtle inhibitions on church liability in tort
flowing from the prohibition against a court answering religious ques-
tions.. For instance, in the case of a breach of a fiduciary duty claimed
to be owed to a church member—the breach perhaps consisting in a
failure to supervise clergy or to respond in a particular way to a
church member's complaint of abuse—the existence of such a rela-
tionship between the church and the member that would give rise to
a duty to act or to act in a particular way may not be based upon an
interpretation of the church's laws, structures or traditions. Even to
describe the parties as church and member is to invoke a relationship
grounded in church law, and so ultimately to determine the content
of a religious idea. Likewise, a duty not to be negligent in supervision,
even if the standard' of care is entirely a creation of secular law and
not based upon church law, may not be imposed on the basis of a
finding of a relationship that is a creation of church law, such as the
relationship between bishop and priest or between bishop and parish-
ioner." To base liability on the existence of such relationships would
violate the Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition. The dangers the Supreme
Court thought it saw in allowing courts to interpret religious terms in
" See Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1997) ("To deter-
mine the existence of an agency relationship based on actual authority, the trial court will
most likely have to examine church doctrine ...."); Heroux v. Carpentier, No. C.A. PC 92-
5807, 1998 WL 388298, at *9 (R.1. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998) (determining whether relation
between bishop and priest is sufficiently agent-like to give rise to duty of care would re-
quire consideration of church doctrine and policies); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434,
443-44 (Wis. 1997) (determining whether knowledge of one priest concerning behavior
of another should be attributed to the diocese would require consideration of first priest's
authority under church law, which is barred by First Amendment); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese
of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791 (Wis. 1995) (indicating that tort of negligent supervi-
sion cannot be asserted because it would require inquiry into church laws, policies and
practices).
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wills, deeds of trust, church constitutions or contracts also would be
present if courts made determinations about relationships grounded
in religious beliefs in deciding whether under tort law there was a
duty to act or to act. in a certain way.
By contrast, it may be possible, although difficult, to base tort li-
ability upon facts identified as existing independently of any norms or
relationships created by church law. For example, it may be possible
to formulate a rule of civil liability that anyone who directs another to
engage in an activity, if he knows or ought to know that the other will
act on the direction, must supervise the other person so as to insure
that in carrying out the direction, the other person does not inflict
harm. The duty thus described may avoid reference to religious
norms or relationships and so avoid violating the Blue Hull-Wolf pro-
hibition." This would mean, however, only that one had avoided that
particular constitutional prohibition, not that all the requirements of
the religion clauses had been met. In addition, of course, the law-
maker, whether legislature or court, may be unwilling to recognize
such a general rule. If the duty is limited to religious organizations,
there would in all likelihood be a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause."
Another situation in which the prohibition against. answering re-
ligious questions may prevent imposing liability on churches involves
respondeat superior. The difficulty is already intimated if the church
is characterized as a principal, master or employer, and the cleric as
an agent, servant or employee. The theory of respondeat superior is
that if a certain relationship exists between one person and another,
or between an organization and an individual, fairness requires that
12 The duty suggested, however, must be carefully scrutinized to see if it does truly
avoid reference to religious ideas. See, e.g„ CJ.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop, 985 P.2d
262, 275 (Wash. 1999) (finding that notice to church official of risk of sexual molestation
of children created duty to protect, founded upon secular facts such as that church
brought children into contact with molester under circumstances that provided peculiar
opportunity for misconduct); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3(1 331, 337 (5th
Cir. 1998) (finding that minister who held himself out as professional marriage counselor
could be held liable not because of violation of standard of care defined by religious teach-
ings, but because of violation of professional standard of care); see also Dausch v. Rykse, 52
F.3d 1425, 1433 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pas-
toral counseling contrasted with secular counseling and holding oneself out as providing
services of psychological counselor). In the hypothetical in the text—one person directing
another to engage in an activity—would evidentiary use of church law to show that a
bishop knew or ought to have known that a priest would act on his direction violate the
Blue Hu 11-Wolf prohibition?
IS See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-38
(1993) (holding that "targeting" religion violates the Free Exercise Clause).
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liability be imposed upon the first person or the organization for the
wrongful acts of the other person. But the prohibition against answer-
ing religious questions forbids looking to church law or structure to
see if such a relationship exists—whether the bishop retained certain
powers, what ditties were imposed upon the minister, what the scope
of the minister's assignment was and so forth. Such issues of authority,
power, duty and discretion, which are examined routinely in nonrelig-
ious cases, may not be inquired into when religious organizations are
involved." Here again, it may be possible, although difficult, to iden-
tify certain facts that exist independently of any consideration of
church law—such as that A had given B directions and B acted upon
them, the notions of giving directions and acting upon them being
entirely secular ideas—as a basis for vicarious liability. But if there is
unwillingness to adopt a rule of such scope, then the question would
be presented whether it is constitutional to have a rule of respondeat
superior specially tailored to religious organizations.
II. VALUE TO BE ATTACHED TO RELIGIOUS OBJECTIVES
Let us suppose that in a case involving a charge of negligent su-
pervision there is no violation of the Blue Hull
-
Wolf prohibition. In-
stead, the rule to be applied is something like the one suggested:
whenever A gives directions to B and B is likely to act upon them, A
has a duty to watch over B so as to protect others from harm from B's
activities. In an ordinary suit for negligent supervision, account would
be taken of the importance of the benefit to be gained by maintaining
a certain relationship between A and B: too close a supervision of B
might thwart the purpose of the enterprise. A court or a jury would
consider the benefit sought to be achieved and weigh it against the
seriousness of the harm that could occur and the risk that that harm
will occur if there is little supervision. In the case of a tort of negligent
supervision by a religious organization, what consideration would be
given to the religious benefits that the organization sought to achieve
by structuring the relationship between A and B in the way it did? 15
14 But see Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 329-31 (Colo. 1993) (finding re-
quired relationship existed between diocese and priest, but that the priest's sexual conduct
was not within the scope of employment); M.K. v. Archdiocese of Portland, Civ. No. 01-
1544-AS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23625, at *11-12 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2001) (magistrate rec-
ommendation) (finding it permissible to look to church law to determine priest's job de-
scription), adopted and remanded by 228 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Or. 2002).
15 See O'Reilly Sc Strasser, supra note 1, at 47 ("Beliefs in penance, admonition and rec-
onciliation as a sacramental response to sin ... ,").
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There are two possibilities. One is to attach no value to the benefit,
precisely because it is a benefit only from a religious point of view.
With no value attached to the benefit, the creation of any risk of the
harm—for example, sexual molestation of minors—would not be
justified. The very setting on foot of the religious enterprise would be
tortious. The other possibility would be to attach a fixed value to the
religious benefit sought to be achieved. This value would be deter-
mined by the benefit's religious character as such, rather than by its
importance in the scheme of a particular religion, so as to avoid vio-
lating the Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition. It would be prohibited, for in-
stance, to determine whether under the beliefs of a particular religion
it was thought important not to inform third parties of allegations of
misbehavior by clergy. The value attached to the religious benefit—.
valued simply because it was religious—would be derived from the
Free Exercise Clause in the light of its underlying constitutional
philosophy. Attaching more than a certain value to religious goals, in
view of the risk of a particular harm deemed such from a secular
point of view, might violate the Establishment Clause."
III. NEUTRAL AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS
It is necessary now to bring into consideration Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, the well-known peyote case that reinterpreted the Free
Exercise Clause. 17 Only a few tort cases involving churches refer to
Smith and almost none discuss it at any length. In some cases Smith is
dismissed as not affecting the protection churches are suggested to
have under constitutional principles shortly to be discussed, namely
the right of church autonomy and the right not to have government
excessively entangled with religion."' But the validity of these princi-
ples and their relation to Smith are not at all clear,
The Supreme Court, in Smith, held that the Free Exercise Clause
does not prohibit the application of a neutral and generally applica-
ble law to religiously motivated conduct, even though there is no
16 Sec Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1989) (finding an exemption
of religious publications from sales tax violated Establishment Clause); Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (finding that requiring employers to give each em-
ployee his or her Sabbath off violated Establishment Clause). But see Corp. of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-40 (1987) (finding the exemption of religious organiza-
tions from the prohibition of religious discrimination in employment did not violate Estab-
lishment Clause).
17 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18 See infra Part V.
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compelling state interest to justify the law. In Smith, a prohibition
against possessing peyote was applied to persons who had used it as
part of a religious ceremony. In a subsequent case, however, Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court made clear that
if a law "targeted" religion for the imposition of a burden, it was not
governed by the Smith rule.° In Lukumi, city ordinances prohibited
the ritual killing of animals while permitting killing for a wide variety
of secular purposes. But the meaning of Lukumi is not clear. For in-
stance, is a rule "neutral and generally applicable" for Smith purposes
if religiously motivated conduct is grouped with some secular activities
for prohibition, but other secular activities are permitted? What
would be the result in Lukumi if nearly all killing of animals was pro-
hibited, including religious killing, but killing for purposes of science
was permitted? What is in question here is the constitutionally permis-
sible relative effect of government action on the positions of religion
and secular values in society.
Negligence in supervision of a person to whom one has given
directions might be proposed as a neutral law of general application
within the meaning of Smith. But should it be so regarded if heed is
paid to the policy that underlies Smith? Recall what was said earlier
regarding the value to be attached to the objective sought to be
achieved by A giving a task to B when the objective is religious." If no
value is attached to the religious objective, then religion probably has
been "targeted" for a disadvantage in the Lukumi sense. If under the
law of torts a fixed value is attached to a religious objective simply be-
cause it is religious, then the question is whether this value accords
with the value that must be attached to the practice of religion by vir-
tue of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
IV. INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT
In Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court stated that its
principle does not apply when there is "individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.”21 It was because
of this exception that Sherbert v. Verner; a case involving a Seventh-day
Adventist's right to unemployment compensation when she could not
get a job because of a religious scruple against working on Saturday,
19 Church of the Lukumi Sabah/ Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-38
(1993).
29 See supra Part IL
21 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
2003]	 Negligent Supervision & Breach of Fiduciary Duty 	 1175
was saved from overruling. 22 When a case falls within the category of
"individualized assessment," there must be a compelling state interest
to justify the imposition of a burden or the denial of a benefit, the
requirement generally applicable under the Free Exercise Clause be-
fore Smith.° The idea behind this exception to the Smith rule—if it is
an exception rather than simply an application of the "neutral and
generally applicable" test—may be that when there is individualized
assessment, either through the development of the common law or in
the course of interpreting broad statutory language, official attitudes
toward religion, for instance as a reason for not working, attitudes
that do not accord with the Constitution's standard for the value that
must be attached to the practice of religion, may creep in and deter-
mine outcomes. So, in such circumstances, in a somewhat awkward
response to that danger, the requirement of a compelling state inter-
est is retained.
A requirement of nonnegligence in supervision, assuming it
passes the neutral and generally applicable test of Smith, would appear
to be an excellent candidate for inclusion in the "individualized as-
sessment" category. Its application is closer to deciding whether a per-
son is unavailable for work without good cause—the question posed
in Sherbert—than to deciding whether peyote has been possessed. 24 In
an ordinary tort suit, as noted earlier, in deciding whether supervision
was negligent, a number of factors would be considered: the serious-
ness of the harm threatened, the risk of that harm occurring, the im-
portance of the good sought to be achieved by the enterprise and the
likelihood that the achievement of that good would be threatened by
requiring a particular kind of supervision. Characteristically, in the
law of negligence, no great degree of certainty of law is ever achieved
or even attempted. Under these conditions, the door would be wide
open for an administrator or a court or a jury to attach no value to a
religious objective or to attach a value that is less than that required
by the religion clauses. Thus a finding of negligence could well
conflict with the constitutional standard regarding the permissible
22 M.; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert presented a situation involving
"individualized assessment" because in it administrators and courts were required to de-
velop views concerning the reasons an individual might have for not working. See id. at
403-06.
29 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 873,884.
24 See 374 U.S. at 399-402; Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246,1249 (D. Colo. 1998)
(stating that a claim of negligent supervision requires a more subjective judgment" than
applying the prohibition in Smith).
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relative effect of government action on the positions of religion and
nonreligion. In addition, of course, there would always lurk the dan-
ger of a violation of the Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition, through a finding
of negligent supervision based on the fact that the church had fallen
below its own standard.
Assume that a claim of negligent supervision comes under the
"individualized assessment" exception to Smith. Assume also that con-
duct has been identified as a basis for liability that avoids violating the
Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition. These conditions might be satisfied either
by a rule that applies to all who engage in specified conduct or by a
rule specially crafted for religious organizations. In the latter case it
may be that even though the rule involves special treatment for relig-
ion, it does not violate the fundamental norm of the religion clauses,
which, as already stated, dictates the permissible relative effect of gov-
ernment action on the positions of religion and nonreligion. This is
still not the end of difficulties, for under the "individualized assess-
ment" exception to the Smith rule, religiously motivated conduct may
not be prohibited or burdened unless there is a compelling reason for
doing so. Whether there is a compelling reason requires considera-
tion of the gravity of the harm threatened—compare sexual molesta-
tion of a minor with sexual relations between a minister and an adult
member of the church who sought pastoral counseling—and the risk
that the harm would occur. These factors must be weighed against the
fixed value that the Constitution attaches to the fact that the kind of
supervision the church provided, or the lack of supervision, was based
upon religious belief. 25
 The reason for the church's supervision or
lack of supervision may be analogous to the Amish reason for not
sending their children to school past the age of sixteen, a reason that
was required to be honored under the Free Exercise Clause in Wiscon-
sin v. Yodel:26
25 It is difficult to understand what position the church could have taken in Malicia u
Doe, 819 So. 2c1 397, 361 (Fla. 2002), to justify the court's statement that the church did not
"claim that the reason they failed to exercise control over Malicki was because of sincerely
held religious beliefs or practices."
26 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972); see also Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 491,
945 (Me. 1997) (finding that compelling state interests did not justify diocese's liability for
negligent supervision of priest who became sexually involved with woman he was counsel-
ing); cf. Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 884-85 (D.C. 2002) (finding dismissed pastor's
interest in reputation—in a suit against trustees of the church for defamation—was not
compelling, but noting that the interest might he compelling in egregious circumstances).
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V. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND NONENTANGLEMENT
So far I have spoken only of the prohibition laid down by the Blue
Hull-Wolf rule against answering religious questions and the Smith rule
regarding neutral and generally applicable laws, along with its excep-
tion for individualized assessments. But a number of other notions
have been deployed by courts in measuring the constitutionality of
tort claims of the sort I have been discussing—negligent supervision
of clergy and breach of fiduciary duty—against the requirements of
the religion clauses. One of these ideas has been expressed as a con-
stitutional right of "church autonomy." In some instances, talk of a
right of church autonomy has been simply a way of referring to the
Blue Hull-Wolf prohibition. 27 In other cases, however, it is said or im-
plied that the right of church autonomy is a distinct constitutional
right and that it. provides a bulwark against the Smith rule.28 Thus it is
suggested that the right of autonomy protects churches against gov-
ernment regulation even when regulation takes the form of a neutral
rule of general applicability and the facts do not. bring the case within
any of the exceptions stated in Employment Division v. Smith, including
the "individualized assessment" exception. 29 Some judicial statements
of the right of church autonomy go so far as to suggest that it protects
churches against regulation even though particular conduct was not
religiously motivated, so long as the conduct took place within the
context of a religious institution." This claim of church autonomy is
27 E.g., McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 850-51 (N.J. 2002).
28 ' E.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655-56 (10th Cir. 2002); see also
Combs v. Cent. Tex, Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an
action for sex discrimination in ministerial appointment because of the Free Exercise right
of the church to manage its own affairs).
29 In Van Osdol v. Vogt, a dismissed minister sued the church on the ground that her
dismissal was in retaliation for her complaint of sexual abuse against a church official. 908
P.2d 1122, 1124 (Colo. 1996). The court held that the First Amendment barred entertain-
ing the suit, distinguishing the dismissal of clergy from the type of situation involved in
Smith. Id, at 1129-31. Applying an antidiscrimination law to churches "would require a
judge to question the belief system of the church, to validate certain interpretations of
religious doctrine over others, or to compel the church to accept certain ideas into their
belief system." Id. at 1131.
3° See, e.g., Combs, 173 F.3d at 350; EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 464-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Schmoll v. Chapman Univ., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1999);
McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 850 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 990, 502 (1979)); see
also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-46 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined
by Marshall, J„ concurring) (finding Establishment Clause was not violated by the exemp-
tion of nonprofit religious organizations from prohibition against religious discrimination
in employment, even with respect to secular jobs, because of the importance of protecting
church autonomy and avoiding entanglement).
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sometimes expressed by stating that under the Constitution, civil
courts lack jurisdiction over tort suits against churches.m
In other cases, a right not to have government "excessively en-
tangled" with religion or religious institutions is named as the barrier
against suits for negligent supervision and breach of fiduciary duty. 32
"Excessive entanglement" is a term usually associated with inquiries
into determining the validity of programs of government aid to relig-
iously-affiliated institutions under the Establishment Clause, but in
some cases it has been invoked as an aspect of Free Exercise protec-
tion." Sometimes government wished to provide protection for relig-
ion, and the Court has cited the avoidance of excessive entanglement
as one reason for allowing the protection. 34
 In other cases, the notion
of excessive entanglement was invoked as the basis for a positive right,
founded in either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment
Clause, to be free from regulation even when government wished to
impose i t. 35
The case of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop furnishes some support for a
right of nonen tanglement based on the Free Exercise Clause.36 In that
case, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") asserted jurisdic-
tion over labor relations between Catholic schools and their lay teach-
ers.37
 The Supreme Court interpreted the statute involved, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, riot to confer jurisdiction on the NLRB
because, as the Court said, if the statute were otherwise interpreted, a
grave question of constitutionality under the religion clauses would be
presented, especially because of entanglement of government with a
religious institution. 38
 The Court came very close to holding that if
the statute conferred jurisdiction, it was unconstitutional.39 The Court
was particularly concerned with the danger that administrators would
impose their own notions about. religion in general or Catholicism in
particular or, consciously or unconsciously, intrude secular values
31 E.g., Heroux v. Carpentier, No. C.A. PC 92-5807, 1998 WL 388298, at *1, 9 (R.I. Su-
per. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998).
92 See, e.g., Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 205 (Utah
2001).
33
 E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-25 (1971) (describing "excessive entan-
glement" under the Establishment Clause); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 357 (Fla. 2002)
(describing "excessive entanglement" pursuant to Free Exercise protection).
m E.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339; see Walz V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
35
 E.g., Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 465-67.
36
 See generally Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490.
37 Id. at 491.
38 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2003); Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 499-501.
99 See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504-07.
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where religious beliefs were entitled to prev-ail.40 Catholic Bishop, of
course, is a pre-Smith case.41
The notion of excessive entanglement may turn out to be indis-
tinguishable from the claimed right of church autonomy and, like it,
extend a mantle of protection to religious institutions even against
neutral laws of general applicability and even though there is no at-
tempt by government to answer a religious question. A case invoking a
broad notion of a church's right to exclude regulation involved a
claim of discrimination on the ground of sex in a ministerial ap-
pointment." Whether the ideas of church autonomy and nonentan-
glement can be limited to ministerial appointments and not extended
to all aspects of church activity seems doubtful, for no reason presents
itself why ministerial appointments should be singled out from other
decisions made in pursuit of a religious mission, at least not without
embracing a particular idea of what is important in religion. Some
courts suggest that the right of church autonomy or nonentangle-
ment is an absolute right, at least in regard to ministerial appoint-
ments, and that this right does not give way even in the face of a com-
pelling mate interest." If the idea of ministerial appointment is
confined to asserting that a person holds a particular ecclesiastical
office or possesses a certain spiritual power, the suggestion may be
unobjectionable. But if the idea of appointment goes beyond that and
includes some identifiable secular facts, the suggestion is hard to ac-
cept. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the religion clauses
prevent application to a church of a rule prohibiting putting a person
who has been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor in contact
with minors, even though such contact is permitted or even required
by religious doctrine.
The seemingly indistinguishable ideas of church autonomy and
nonentanglement may provide a barrier to suits based on claims of
negligent supervision and breach of fiduciary duty." But, as already
4° Id. at 501-04.
41 For an additional example, see Rayburn v. Gen, conference of Seventh-day Adventists,
where the court found that applying a prohibition against racial discrimination in em-
ployment to a church's pastoral position violated both religion clauses. 772 F.2d 1164,
1168-71 (4th Cir. 1985).
42 Combs, 173 F.3d at 349; see also Rayburn, 772 F,2d at 1168-71.
" See, e.g.. Vogt, 908 P.2d at 1130-31.
41 Sec Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441,445 (Me. 1997) ("The imposi-
tion of secular duties and liability on the church as a 'principal' will infringe upon its right
to determine the standards governing the relationship between the church, its bishop, and
the parish priest.").
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suggested, such tort claims may be more easily derailed by one of the
principles earlier discussed, that a religious question may not be an-
swered by government and that when a case involves "individualized
assessment," a compelling state interest is required. 45 But governmen-
tal regulation can be imagined that may escape these other limitations
and leave only the claimed right of church autonomy or nonentan-
glement. Consider, for instance, a statute that requires employers to
report to civil authorities accusations of sexual abuse made against
employees. Possibly the church and the minister can be identified as
employer and employee by virtue of facts of a purely secular charac-
ter. The rule is broadly applicable to all employers and does not call
for any "individualized assessment." Under these circumstances, as-
suming Smith to be established law, only invocation of some notions
such as church autonomy and nonentanglement can keep open the
possibility of requiring a compelling state interest to justify the regula-
tion, or in their more absolutist form, to sustain a claim of immunity
even in the face of a compelling state interest.
45
 Would the tort of breach of fiduciary duty, if formulated as a duty of A to act to pro-
tect B if A caused B to trust him, a reasonable person in A's position would have realized
that B would trust him and B did in fact trust him, escape violation of the Blue Hull-Wolf
prohibition if applied in a church context? In Martinelli a. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Dioce-
san Corp., a bishop was held to have violated a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff when the
bishop had reason to know that a priest had molested one boy, but did nothing to protect
other boys, including the plaintiff. 10 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Conn. 1998). The court thought
the church had encouraged the plaintiff and his parents to view the bishop as an authority
and to trust him and that they had trusted him. Id. at 198, 156. It seems unlikely that a
legal definition can be attached to the term "trust" that does not require consideration of
the meaning the parties attached to communications between them, which in the context
of this case certainly were intended to be viewed from a religious perspective.
